Ukraine's Identity Crisis: Understanding the Protests and the Politics (Transitions Online Series Book 5) (English Edition) [Kindle-editie] beoordelingen het boek quotes

In recent months observers waited with much anticipation for the 28 November Vilnius summit, at which Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia were to sign associate member agreements with the European Union. The event was billed as a momentous occasion in European history – the point at which the legacy of a Europe divided, dating back to the 1945 Yalta accords, would finally be overcome. The Vilnius summit was also seen as vindication for the EU’s Eastern Partnership policy, an initiative launched in 2009 to reach out to Eastern neighbors who, it seemed clear, would not be offered full membership anytime soon.   Those heady expectations were abruptly deflated on 22 November, when Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych announced that he would not, after all, be signing the association agreement, or a related free-trade agreement. Massive demonstrations soon broke out on the streets of Kyiv and other cities following the announcement.   In the wake of the botched summit, critics began asking why the EU was rushing to sign up a country like Ukraine, whose democratic credentials clearly fall far short of what is required and whose leader cannot be trusted to follow through on his commitments. Others, pointing at some local polls that expressed very mixed opinions over whether Ukraine should move closer to the EU if that would antagonize Russia, wondered whether the country would ever get beyond its identify crisis.   Ukraine is, after all, blessed with a political system considerably more open and pluralistic than that of Russia. But that is also a curse. For the price Ukraine is paying for that pluralism is chronic instability and poor governance. Unlike Russia, the Ukrainian state is not strong enough to decisively suppress political dissent. In 2004, in the so-called Orange Revolution, ordinary Ukrainians were able to take to the streets and overturn the results of a rigged election – something that has never happened in Russia.   However, one election does not a democracy make. The subsequent record of the post-Orange government, under President Viktor Yushchenko, showed that the pro-Western political leaders were just as prone to cronyism and factionalism as their pro-Russian adversaries. The election of Yanukovych to the presidency in 2010, in a fairly free election, was a blow to the hopes for reform in Ukraine. This e-book represents a collection of recent TOL articles putting the current turmoil in context, allowing readers to gain a better understanding of the roots of the discontent that have led hundreds of Ukrainians out onto the streets.