This monograph utilizes select elements of operational art from ADRP 3-0 to examine how General Lewis Walt employed operational art as the III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF) commander in Vietnam from June 1965-June 1967. This study addresses a significant shortfall in literature focused on Corps-level operational commanders during the Vietnam War. While the concept of operational art did not exist in U.S. doctrine in 1965, this study of General Walt demonstrates the enduring principles behind operational art while suggesting several other topics for consideration and analysis. In combat, III MAF faced a hybrid threat of North Vietnamese regular forces and entrenched Viet Cong main force and guerrilla units. Apart from the significant challenges of combat operations, General Walt found himself confronted by vague and restricting U.S. policy, ineffective U.S. and South Vietnamese civilian and governmental agencies, a complex South Vietnamese civilian and military operating environment, and competing warfighting strategies and interservice rivalries between his U.S. Army combat chain-of-command and internal Marine Corps leadership. Despite these challenges, Walt developed and executed an effective operational approach which addressed substantial enemy threats while supporting the government of South Vietnam and its military forces.
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